Recapturing the Reluctant Radical: how to win back Europe’s populist vote by Catherine Fieschi, Marley Morris and Lila Caballero by Counterpoint
Notes
1.‘EU leader Van Rompuy sees “populist” threat to Schengen’; and ‘Nick Clegg on the EU’
2.Stratfor, ‘Nationalism, populism and the collapse of the EU’
3.Alderman, ‘Greek far right hangs a target on immigrants’
4.Stanley, ‘Marine Le Pen: neither left nor right, just a chain-smoking, race-baiting opportunist’
5.Goodspeed, ‘Flirting with fascism: why Europe can’t shake its weakness for nazism’
6.‘Greek far-right Golden Dawn MP wanted for assault’
7.Pidd, ‘Poor, abused and second-class: the Roma living in fear in Hungarian village’
8.Taylor, ‘English Defence League: inside the violent world of Britain’s new far right’
9.White, ‘Dealing with concerns of young men after life in the military’
10.Wieder, ‘Marine Le Pen pourrait arriver en tête chez les jeunes’; and Skyring, ‘Far-right Freedom Party most popular among young Austrians’
11.Bartlett, Birdwell and Littler, The New Face of Digital Populism
12.For a fuller analysis of the term ‘populism’ and how it can be applied to different movements, see Fieschi, ‘A plague on both your populisms’; and Fieschi, ‘Trust, cynicism and populist anti-politics’.
13.Hooper, ‘Umberto Bossi resigns as leader of Northern League amid funding scandal’
14.In the graph comparing election results pre- and post-crisis, we define pre-crisis up to the end of 2009 and post-crisis from 2010 onwards. For Austria, Norway and Italy we use recent poll results rather than election results, as these are not available. The Austrian poll is from https://neuwal.com/ (last accessed 15 Aug 12), the Norwegian poll is from ‘Ap faller dramatisk’, siste.no (poll conducted by Opinion Perduco); the Italian poll is from www.archivio.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/ (poll conducted 19 Jun 2012). The election results are obtained from the European Election Database, with the exception of the Greek Golden Dawn 2009 result, which is obtained from Spillius, ‘Greek immigrants urge parties to isolate far-right Golden Dawn’. Elections referred to are all parliamentary, apart from France, where the figures refer to presidential elections.
15.Bartlett, Birdwell and Littler, The New Face of Digital Populism
16.Goodwin and Evans, From Voting to Violence
17.A series of brutal murders over the past year have brought this point home – beginning with the Anders Breivik shootings in Utøya and the bombing in Oslo, followed by the revelations in Germany surrounding a murderous neo-Nazi cell and the shooting of two Senegalese street vendors in Florence by a Casa Pound sympathiser. If the committed supporters are the ones most likely to turn to violence, as the Chatham House report we have mentioned suggested, then surely, some argue, these are the people mainstream policy-makers should be worried about.
18.Mayer and Perrineau, ‘Why do they vote for Le Pen?’
19.Gombin, ‘Is there such a thing as extreme right voters? The case of the French Front National’
20.Our use of the term ‘radical’ in this pamphlet captures only the fact that the people we are concerned with have voted for (or will potentially vote for) a party outside the mainstream. We are not suggesting that the reluctant radicals are anti-democratic extremists, or that they are connected to left-wing anti-establishment radicalism.
21.A good example of this thinking can be found in Goodhart and O’Leary, ‘Welcome to the post-liberal majority’.
22.‘Est-ainsi que les hommes votent?’; see also the year-long blog www.lemonde.fr/une-annee-en-france/
23.Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe
24.Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter
25.Evans, Voters and Voting: An Introduction, p. 64
26.With the exception of Finland; see Chapter 5.
27.Ivarsflaten, ‘What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases’
28.Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, section 3.2.2
29.We include only Northern Italy in the analysis since the Italian RPP we study, Lega Nord, is a regionalist party of the North.
30.We also control for the differences across the different rounds of the ESS.
31.Arzheimer, ‘Electoral sociology: who votes for the extreme right and why – and when?’
32.See Chapter 5 for an explanation for why the True Finns is male dominated.
33.Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, p. 113
34.See, for example, Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, ‘Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe’; and Arzheimer, ‘Contextual factors and the extreme right vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002’
35.Particular caution should be applied to the result for Germany, where the Hosmer–Lemeshow test suggested the model was a poor fit.
36.Arzheimer, ‘Electoral sociology: who votes for the extreme right and why – and when?’
37.Bartlett, Birdwell, Krekó, Benfield and Gyori, Populism in Europe: Hungary
38.Oesch, ‘Explaining workers’ support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland’; and Arzheimer, ‘Electoral sociology: who votes for the extreme right and why – and when?’
39.Using the ISCO-88 categorisation, craft and related trade workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers and elementary occupations are classified as blue-collar workers.
40.Caution should be applied to this result, since the Hosmer–Lemeshow test suggested a poor fit; however, the model was a better fit when the gender variable was removed.
41.In Italy, we were unable to include unemployment within our model.
42.For the analysis of the British reluctant radicals, unfortunately we were unable to include a variable on extreme-right ideology.
43.Particular caution should be applied to the results for Denmark and Norway, where the Hosmer–Lemeshow test suggested the model was a poor fit.
44.See, for example, Oesch, ‘Explaining workers’ support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland’; and Lucassen and Lubbers, ‘Who fears what? Explaining far-right-wing preference in Europe by distinguishing perceived cultural and economic ethnic threats’
45.We did not have comparable variables for Britain, but found that anger over immigration increased the likelihood of being a reluctant BNP supporter and of being a reluctant UKIP supporter.
46.Betz, ‘The new politics of resentment: radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe’
47.Particular caution should be applied to the result for Germany, where the Hosmer–Lemeshow test suggested the model was a poor fit.
48.Perrineau, ‘Marine Le Pen: voter pour une nouvelle extreme droite’, p. 32
49.‘Dédiabolisation’
50.Arzheimer, ‘Electoral sociology: who votes for the extreme right and why – and when?’
51.See Turchi, ‘How Sarkozy’s UMP gave legitimacy to the far-right Front National’
52.Mayer, ‘Le Pen’s comeback: the 2002 French presidential election’
53.Bauman, Liquid Modernity, p. 109
54.Lehingue, ‘Les conglomérats électoraux frontistes: pistes de recherche’
55.Mayer, ‘Le Pen’s comeback: the 2002 French presidential election’
56.Veugelers, ‘Social cleavage and the revival of far right parties: the case of France’s National Front’
57.See Helen Lewis’ Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, and her analysis of the shame and anger loop and reference to ‘feeling traps’.
58.Our interpretation in this chapter is influenced by conversations with a number of different Dutch researchers and activists, representing a diverse range of views. They include Yvonne Zonderop, Farid Tabarki, Sarah De Lange, Willem Wagenaar, Rene Danen, Frans Timmermans and Mark Dechesne.
59.Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, p. 67
60.Akkerman, ‘Anti-immigration parties and the defence of liberal
values: the exceptional case of the List Pim Fortuyn’
61.Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, p. 66
62.Mair, ‘Electoral volatility and the Dutch political system’; and Daalder, ‘The Netherlands: still a consociational democracy?’
63.Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, p. 62
64.See van Kessel, ‘Explaining the electoral performance of populist parties: the Netherlands as a case study’
65.Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam
66.van Kessel, ‘Explaining the electoral performance of populist parties: the Netherlands as a case study’
67.Partij voor de Vrijheid, Hún Brussel, óns Nederland. Verkiezingsprogramma 2012–2017
68.Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2010
69.Timo Soini announced last year that the English version of the name of the party had changed from True Finns to The Finns. We stick to True Finns here because it is a better English translation of the Finnish ‘Perussuomalaiset’.
70.Railo and Vares, The Many Faces of Populism
71.‘Jussi Halla-aho’s successor to be determined next week’
72.True Finns, ‘Fitting for the Finns – the True Finns’ election programme for the parliamentary election 2011 / Summary’
73.Finnish National Election Study 2011
74.Toivonen, ‘An historical perspective on The Finns party support’
75.Grönlund, ‘Determinants of choosing The Finns party in the election of 2011’
76.Ignazi, ‘The silent counter-revolution’
77.Rahkonen, ‘National election surveys and the supporters of the True Finns party’
78.We thank Rauli Mickelsson for this idea.
79.Veugelers, ‘Right-wing extremism in contemporary France: a “silent counterrevolution”?’
80.See Goodwin, Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe
81.Arzheimer, ‘Contextual factors and the extreme right vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002’
82.Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe
83.See Bouchard and Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation
84.See https://counterpoint.uk.com/research-projects/reluctant-radicals-2/
1.‘EU leader Van Rompuy sees “populist” threat to Schengen’; and ‘Nick Clegg on the EU’
2.Stratfor, ‘Nationalism, populism and the collapse of the EU’
3.Alderman, ‘Greek far right hangs a target on immigrants’
4.Stanley, ‘Marine Le Pen: neither left nor right, just a chain-smoking, race-baiting opportunist’
5.Goodspeed, ‘Flirting with fascism: why Europe can’t shake its weakness for nazism’
6.‘Greek far-right Golden Dawn MP wanted for assault’
7.Pidd, ‘Poor, abused and second-class: the Roma living in fear in Hungarian village’
8.Taylor, ‘English Defence League: inside the violent world of Britain’s new far right’
9.White, ‘Dealing with concerns of young men after life in the military’
10.Wieder, ‘Marine Le Pen pourrait arriver en tête chez les jeunes’; and Skyring, ‘Far-right Freedom Party most popular among young Austrians’
11.Bartlett, Birdwell and Littler, The New Face of Digital Populism
12.For a fuller analysis of the term ‘populism’ and how it can be applied to different movements, see Fieschi, ‘A plague on both your populisms’; and Fieschi, ‘Trust, cynicism and populist anti-politics’.
13.Hooper, ‘Umberto Bossi resigns as leader of Northern League amid funding scandal’
14.In the graph comparing election results pre- and post-crisis, we define pre-crisis up to the end of 2009 and post-crisis from 2010 onwards. For Austria, Norway and Italy we use recent poll results rather than election results, as these are not available. The Austrian poll is from https://neuwal.com/ (last accessed 15 Aug 12), the Norwegian poll is from ‘Ap faller dramatisk’, siste.no (poll conducted by Opinion Perduco); the Italian poll is from www.archivio.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/ (poll conducted 19 Jun 2012). The election results are obtained from the European Election Database, with the exception of the Greek Golden Dawn 2009 result, which is obtained from Spillius, ‘Greek immigrants urge parties to isolate far-right Golden Dawn’. Elections referred to are all parliamentary, apart from France, where the figures refer to presidential elections.
15.Bartlett, Birdwell and Littler, The New Face of Digital Populism
16.Goodwin and Evans, From Voting to Violence
17.A series of brutal murders over the past year have brought this point home – beginning with the Anders Breivik shootings in Utøya and the bombing in Oslo, followed by the revelations in Germany surrounding a murderous neo-Nazi cell and the shooting of two Senegalese street vendors in Florence by a Casa Pound sympathiser. If the committed supporters are the ones most likely to turn to violence, as the Chatham House report we have mentioned suggested, then surely, some argue, these are the people mainstream policy-makers should be worried about.
18.Mayer and Perrineau, ‘Why do they vote for Le Pen?’
19.Gombin, ‘Is there such a thing as extreme right voters? The case of the French Front National’
20.Our use of the term ‘radical’ in this pamphlet captures only the fact that the people we are concerned with have voted for (or will potentially vote for) a party outside the mainstream. We are not suggesting that the reluctant radicals are anti-democratic extremists, or that they are connected to left-wing anti-establishment radicalism.
21.A good example of this thinking can be found in Goodhart and O’Leary, ‘Welcome to the post-liberal majority’.
22.‘Est-ainsi que les hommes votent?’; see also the year-long blog www.lemonde.fr/une-annee-en-france/
23.Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe
24.Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter
25.Evans, Voters and Voting: An Introduction, p. 64
26.With the exception of Finland; see Chapter 5.
27.Ivarsflaten, ‘What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases’
28.Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, section 3.2.2
29.We include only Northern Italy in the analysis since the Italian RPP we study, Lega Nord, is a regionalist party of the North.
30.We also control for the differences across the different rounds of the ESS.
31.Arzheimer, ‘Electoral sociology: who votes for the extreme right and why – and when?’
32.See Chapter 5 for an explanation for why the True Finns is male dominated.
33.Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, p. 113
34.See, for example, Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, ‘Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe’; and Arzheimer, ‘Contextual factors and the extreme right vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002’
35.Particular caution should be applied to the result for Germany, where the Hosmer–Lemeshow test suggested the model was a poor fit.
36.Arzheimer, ‘Electoral sociology: who votes for the extreme right and why – and when?’
37.Bartlett, Birdwell, Krekó, Benfield and Gyori, Populism in Europe: Hungary
38.Oesch, ‘Explaining workers’ support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland’; and Arzheimer, ‘Electoral sociology: who votes for the extreme right and why – and when?’
39.Using the ISCO-88 categorisation, craft and related trade workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers and elementary occupations are classified as blue-collar workers.
40.Caution should be applied to this result, since the Hosmer–Lemeshow test suggested a poor fit; however, the model was a better fit when the gender variable was removed.
41.In Italy, we were unable to include unemployment within our model.
42.For the analysis of the British reluctant radicals, unfortunately we were unable to include a variable on extreme-right ideology.
43.Particular caution should be applied to the results for Denmark and Norway, where the Hosmer–Lemeshow test suggested the model was a poor fit.
44.See, for example, Oesch, ‘Explaining workers’ support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland’; and Lucassen and Lubbers, ‘Who fears what? Explaining far-right-wing preference in Europe by distinguishing perceived cultural and economic ethnic threats’
45.We did not have comparable variables for Britain, but found that anger over immigration increased the likelihood of being a reluctant BNP supporter and of being a reluctant UKIP supporter.
46.Betz, ‘The new politics of resentment: radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe’
47.Particular caution should be applied to the result for Germany, where the Hosmer–Lemeshow test suggested the model was a poor fit.
48.Perrineau, ‘Marine Le Pen: voter pour une nouvelle extreme droite’, p. 32
49.‘Dédiabolisation’
50.Arzheimer, ‘Electoral sociology: who votes for the extreme right and why – and when?’
51.See Turchi, ‘How Sarkozy’s UMP gave legitimacy to the far-right Front National’
52.Mayer, ‘Le Pen’s comeback: the 2002 French presidential election’
53.Bauman, Liquid Modernity, p. 109
54.Lehingue, ‘Les conglomérats électoraux frontistes: pistes de recherche’
55.Mayer, ‘Le Pen’s comeback: the 2002 French presidential election’
56.Veugelers, ‘Social cleavage and the revival of far right parties: the case of France’s National Front’
57.See Helen Lewis’ Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, and her analysis of the shame and anger loop and reference to ‘feeling traps’.
58.Our interpretation in this chapter is influenced by conversations with a number of different Dutch researchers and activists, representing a diverse range of views. They include Yvonne Zonderop, Farid Tabarki, Sarah De Lange, Willem Wagenaar, Rene Danen, Frans Timmermans and Mark Dechesne.
59.Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, p. 67
60.Akkerman, ‘Anti-immigration parties and the defence of liberal
61.Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, p. 66
62.Mair, ‘Electoral volatility and the Dutch political system’; and Daalder, ‘The Netherlands: still a consociational democracy?’
63.Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, p. 62
64.See van Kessel, ‘Explaining the electoral performance of populist parties: the Netherlands as a case study’
65.Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam
66.van Kessel, ‘Explaining the electoral performance of populist parties: the Netherlands as a case study’
67.Partij voor de Vrijheid, Hún Brussel, óns Nederland. Verkiezingsprogramma 2012–2017
68.Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2010
69.Timo Soini announced last year that the English version of the name of the party had changed from True Finns to The Finns. We stick to True Finns here because it is a better English translation of the Finnish ‘Perussuomalaiset’.
70.Railo and Vares, The Many Faces of Populism
71.‘Jussi Halla-aho’s successor to be determined next week’
72.True Finns, ‘Fitting for the Finns – the True Finns’ election programme for the parliamentary election 2011 / Summary’
73.Finnish National Election Study 2011
74.Toivonen, ‘An historical perspective on The Finns party support’
75.Grönlund, ‘Determinants of choosing The Finns party in the election of 2011’
76.Ignazi, ‘The silent counter-revolution’
77.Rahkonen, ‘National election surveys and the supporters of the True Finns party’
78.We thank Rauli Mickelsson for this idea.
79.Veugelers, ‘Right-wing extremism in contemporary France: a “silent counterrevolution”?’
80.See Goodwin, Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe
81.Arzheimer, ‘Contextual factors and the extreme right vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002’
82.Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe
83.See Bouchard and Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation
84.See https://counterpoint.uk.com/research-projects/reluctant-radicals-2/