Special Forces: A Guided Tour of U.S. Army Special Forces by Tom Clancy
Though nothing much of interest was going on—unless you like to watch people packing—the conversation was stimulating, and the Camp commander, also a major, invited us to join his men for lunch, which was served buffet-style in a large tent. The food, prepared by a local caterer, was chicken, lamb, rice, vegetables, and some traditional American fare.
As we ate, the commander briefed us on his mission and on life as an SOF unit in the CENTCOM AOR.
Since it takes so much effort and such a long time to transport people to and from the Persian Gulf, the local SOCCENT commander works hard to keep his troops in theater as long as possible. This requirement has inspired what is called “Hub and Spoke” concept: Once they’re in the AOR, SF teams move from one mission (out on a “spoke”) to another somewhere else in the region (out on another spoke). The “Hub” is CENTSOC Forward headquarters in Bahrain. Hub and Spoke lets one team do several missions in theater before returning home, a benefit for limited transport resources, and it keeps more SF units in the region, which is good in case of a fast-breaking crisis. Its downside is it wastes the most valuable SF resource (personnel) on missions that sometimes resemble “make work,” and badly bums out 5th SFG personnel, who are already the busiest SF soldiers in the Army.
It was clear that the SF soldiers felt they had spent too much time at Camp Kalid doing make work. Though they had been engaged in solid training with the local armed forces, that had taken up only about seven of the fifty days of their deployment. For the other forty-three days, they sat frustrated in their tents staying out of the sun and waiting for the Bahrainis to show up. Poor U.S. State and DoD coordination with Bahrain had, in their view, messed things up badly.
Under the circumstances, they were understandably eager to go home. And in fact, they did make it home in time for the holidays.
After lunch, I grabbed a bottle of cold water and was given a tour of what was left of Camp Kalid (much of the facility had already been taken down and packed up).
The bunkers, I learned, had been used as security and communications shacks, while the men themselves had lived in the tents. Nearby, the 2/5th SFG soldiers had laid out marksmanship ranges and navigation courses for the JCET training.
As we walked around, the commander gave me his views on his soldiers’ main complaints—and conceded that much of their frustration was valid, but he was quick to point out that good training had been run, his men had gotten useful interaction with their allied counterparts, and all had learned valuable lessons for future JCET missions.
He also pointed out that the crisis with Iraq had put strains on relations between the U.S. and its allies in the Persian Gulf, and this called for patience. Few non-Iraqi Arabs are fond of Saddam Hussein, and most are grateful to the U.S. for standing up to him. But the Iraqis are their Arab brothers. And most Arabs—while the best of hosts during a short stay—are very nervous at the thought of a long-term foreign (read U.S.) presence in their lands. Best for all—in their view—would be for everyone involved to end their differences, and get back to pumping oil.
In short, most Arabs would like the Iraqi problem to simply go away.
About midafternoon, we completed the tour and headed back for Manama. On the way, Major Neil pointed out one of Bahrain’s more interesting tourist sights, the “Tree of Life,” a gnarled and ugly Joshua tree in the middle of nowhere, the only living thing of any size in a desolate tract of desert, and arguably the oldest living thing on the planet (it has been dated at thousands of years old). Here, some Muslims believe, the Garden of Eden may have been located.
Farther along, we passed burial mounds, for which Bahrain is famous (the national museum has a fascinating display devoted to them). Thousands were scattered around the island, varying in size from small mounds for individuals to elaborate structures for many people.
Not long after that, we were back in the Las Vegas of the Gulf and our hotel... soon followed by a shower, a nap, and a good dinner at the Hotel Diplomat, a local landmark.
Friday, November 20th—SOCCENT Headquarters (Forward), Bahrain
While Bahrain is more relaxed about Islamic rules than other Arab states, Fridays—the Muslim Sabbath—are still slow and quiet (though shops are allowed to open for a few hours in the middle of the day).
Since there was a few hours to kill before my next scheduled events—a visit with the commander of the forward element of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCCENT), followed by my flight to Kuwait—I spent some time exploring the local Souk, the Arab market place, and well worth the visit.
Then it was a run over to the American naval compound and a visit with the local SOCCENT commander.
Because Bahrain is one of the few Arab nations that has allowed the development of permanent foreign bases on its soil, it has become an important lynchpin for U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf.
The harbor showed a substantial number of U.S., British, and Bahraini warships. And beside the harbor was growing one of the largest construction sites I’ve ever seen. Dozens of buildings were under construction behind a solid block wall perimeter. This was the Naval Forces, Central Command (NAVCENT) Forward complex, which had been in the works for several years.
Previously, NAVCENT had been based on a converted amphibious ship, the USS LaSalle (AGF-3). But now that the region had been given its own fleet designator (U.S. 5th Fleet), more permanent facilities had become necessary.
All of it, predictably, was being built like a fortress, fully self-contained, with billeting just outside the gate for personnel with families.
After a close check of our credentials, Major Neil and I entered the compound and walked a half-mile to the air-conditioned trailers that house the SOCCENT Forward headquarters, where Neil introduced me to Colonel James B. Conners, USAF, a veteran of the USAF SOC community, with a specialty in gunship operations.
Inside his office, the colonel took me through a varied and detailed rundown of SOF operations in the Persian Gulf.
He began by pointing out on a map the operations then running. Then he shared his thoughts on the near-war alert of the previous weekend. “We came this close to actual combat,” he confirmed.
The alert had caused many other headaches, and led to his most immediately pressing problem: A lot of troops had started deploying to the Gulf, and for now they weren’t needed. Worse, many units were stacked up in Europe and the Azores, with only the vaguest idea where they would end up. Worse still, deployments are hugely expensive (they’re paid for out of various contingency funds, but it’s still a zero sum game—somebody would lose; somebody’s ox would be gored). So the colonel was doing his best to work with his superiors to sort things out and reverse the flow of personnel into his AOR.
Moving on to broader issues, Colonel Conners is very eager to see a dedicated SOF forward headquarters in the region, away from Army, Navy, and Air Force facilities99 where SOF units are feeling squeezed. This would also please the local host nations, who would like to spread the American presence thinner. That is, they’d like the American presence to be less visibly present.
One idea is to build a dedicated SOF facility in Qatar, where the government has expressed willingness to allow it. But the key limiting factor right now is money, which, as always, is in short supply. Lawmakers in Washington much prefer to spend construction funds in their own states than in foreign lands. Nevertheless, SOCOM is convinced a forward headquarters is necessary, and will probably be funded once the naval construction in Bahrain is completed.
A change of command at the U.S. Navy compound in Bahrain. This compound supports operations by Navy SEALs and special warfare craft, along with Air Force and Army Special Operations units around the Persian Gulf.
JOHN D. GRESHAM
When the briefing was over, I accepted the colonel’s invitation to accompany him to the other side of the compound to witness a small joint ceremony—a change of command for the local Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) team commander.
After a short walk, we en
Meanwhile, several hundred SOF personnel from all the services had gathered, with a large contingent of Navy SEALs in their formal whites. What followed was one of the more agreeable of military traditions: a formal change of command in the field. The outgoing commander’s achievements were noted—including the establishment of the forward SEAL presence in the Persian Gulf. And there were sly comments about how the SEALs had recently used a small Mark V patrol boat to survey the vital Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Oman. In fact, that very night another Mark V would lead the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) CVBG into the Persian Gulf, where it would replace the group headed by the USS Eisenhower (CVN-69). It was a busy time in the Gulf.
An hour later, Major Neil and I were back at the airport for the hour-long flight to Kuwait. The flight was quick and comfortable, though full: Many Kuwaitis were returning home to start the Islamic workweek the next morning.
Kuwait International Airport was a shock after the almost casual security in Bahrain. The war scare may have been over, but you’d have had a hard time believing that here. Thousands of people were arriving this evening—allied military personnel, civilian contractors, and the usual flow of businessmen and civilians; and the Kuwaiti Ministry of the Interior Police (who handle local security, customs, border patrols, and antiterrorist functions) were out in force, each with his black uniform and MP-5 machine pistol.
After we passed through customs, Neil led me to the airport exit, where we were met by a burly man in civilian clothes—obviously a senior SF soldier. His name was Chief Warrant Officer Wade, and he was assigned to provide security and protective services during my visit. Wade directed us to a large Chevy Suburban in the parking lot.
On the twenty-minute drive that followed, I was shotgunned with security information and rules, in effect because of the Iraqi situation and concerns about reportedly active Islamic terrorist groups. That meant a full-fledged escape and evasion (E&E) plan had been worked out. Simply put, any time I was away from my hotel, I would be riding in this tank of an automobile surrounded by men with enough firepower to take out a shopping mall. In the back were several cans of fuel, a carton of MREs, and a couple of cases of bottled water just in case we had to run for Saudi Arabia.
The fact that I had entered a potential—and recent—war zone really hit home when I arrived at the Sheraton Kuwait. Its walls were splattered with the plastered-over bullet holes from the fighting in 1991. A sobering thought as I checked in for the night.
Saturday, November 21st—Camp Doha, Kuwait
Chief Wade arrived with the Suburban early the next morning. Today we were to check in at Camp Doha west of Kuwait City; and we were soon headed down a congested, four-lane boulevard beside the harbor. Noting the traffic, Chief Wade commented, “Metric Monday.” Meaning: the Islamic workweek started on Saturday.
After about twenty minutes, the huge white walls of Camp Doha became visible, and we turned in to the security headquarters.
Camp Doha is the Army’s forward headquarters in the Persian Gulf, and has been since the U.S. Army took it over from the UN back in the early 1990s; enough equipment is pre-positioned here for an entire armored or mechanized brigade, along with the support infrastructure for up to a division of follow-on troops. At any given time, under what is called Operation Intrinsic Action, there is usually a battalion from the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) operating in Kuwait.
Though they are not technically based there (in deference to Kuwaiti sensitivities), Camp Doha is normally home to several thousand U.S. Army personnel. But the recent excitement had greatly swelled that number. An entire armored brigade and a Patriot missile battalion had fallen onto the equipment stockpiles... and were now putting everything back into storage and hoping to find transportation home for the holidays.
Our business was on the eastern end of the base, in one of the many warehouses that had been converted into barracks and operations buildings. After obtaining security badges and passing through a tough security checkpoint, Major Neil and I entered Advanced Operating Base (AOB) 590, the home of U.S. Special Forces in Kuwait. Here I would get briefed on SF operations in the region, prior to going out to the field.
The first briefing came from the Special Operations Command and Control Element—Kuwait (SOCCE-K) commander, a lieutenant colonel, who very quickly made clear the mission of SOF units in Kuwait: While a few JCET Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions were underway, and SF maritime units support the ongoing maritime embargo of Iraq, supplying personnel and boats for the blockade, the SOF presence in Kuwait was primarily aimed at the threat of Iraqi (and also potentially Iranian) aggression ... and specifically to stop any Iraqi or Iranian invasion short of Kuwait City. If war breaks out, U.S. SOF personnel are charged with helping the Kuwaiti Army gather intelligence, conduct artillery and close air support (CAS) missions, and support combat search-and-rescue of downed allied aircrews.
At the heart of the SOCCE-K mission is an operation, called Iris Gold, that takes up most of the SF muscle in the area.
At this point, AOB 590’s commander, Major Wes, took over the briefing. Iris Gold, he explained, was a continuous company-sized JCS deployment from 5th SFG to Camp Doha—six ODAs, an ODB, and other supporting elements. The ODAs further break into a total of twenty-one three-man teams (called Coalition Support Teams—CSTs), each of which is equipped with a Ground Mobility Vehicle packed with fuel, ammunition, food, and radio gear. CSTs are highly skilled at operating with their Kuwait counterparts in the field; and under normal conditions, each can operate for a week with resupply only of water and diesel fuel.
The purpose of Iris Gold is to bolster the four Kuwait Land Forces (KLF) brigades (each with four armored/mechanized battalions) with enough airpower to hold on until follow-on allied land forces can arrive.100 Since the four KLF brigades are now upgrading to new M1 Abrams tanks and Warrior infantry fighting vehicles, this is not a bad bet.
To implement that purpose, a mounted CST is assigned to every Kuwaiti brigade and battalion headquarters, with another stationed with the Kuwait Land Forces (KLF) mobile headquarters when deployed. In an invasion, the CSTs would provide a ground coordination element to call in artillery and allied CAS missions. (I should also say that a CST presence at every Kuwait TOC is an excellent way to determine Kuwaiti morale and to get the “ground truth” in a combat situation.)
Every four months, a new company from 5th SFG rotates in. A company from 3rd/5th SFG was currently handling the duty. They had arrived in early October, and were due to rotate out in late January.
A map showing how the Iris Gold Special Forces teams would be deployed in time of war.
RUBINCON, INC. BY LAURA DENINNO
Major Wes’s briefing would continue later. But first, I headed over to lunch at the Camp Doha mess hall—a vast warehouse, with enough tables and seats for over a thousand personnel—and then returned to the SOF area for a tour of the facilities.
Compared with the folks back at Camp Kalid in Bahrain, these soldiers had a comfortable life. Team members were billeted in air-conditioned, two-man rooms with common lavatory/shower facilities, and recreational areas. All had television sets (most were tuned to CNN or the BBC during the day). In the evenings, movies and popcorn were standard.
After the tour, I returned to the SOCCE-K/Iris Gold command center for the conclusion of Major Wes’s briefing:
Operating in Kuwait necessarily placed limitations on U.S. personnel, he began. Though the Emirate is not as strict as Saudi Arabia and some of the other Persian Gulf States, it is still a Muslim country. Which means no consumption of alcohol by U.S. military personnel, no direct interaction with Kuwaiti women outside the Camp
Next came my itinerary during the coming days: I was to visit a number of sites around the Emirate, starting tomorrow with visits to 5th SFG ODAs doing independent JCET training deployments.
He concluded by handing me a thick manila envelope, containing a folded map made of Tyvec paper (a synthetic paper that is waterproof and almost indestructible) and printed in camouflaged shades. This was an escape map used by aircrews and other at-risk personnel who work in this part of the Persian Gulf, and it showed details of Kuwait, southern Iraq, and northern Saudi Arabia that don’t appear in tourist guides or local maps.
As he passed it over, Wes said, “So you’ll know where you are ... just in case.” He did not need to say more. Iraq was less than an hour’s drive away.
On that daunting note, Major Neil, Chief Wade, and I returned to the Suburban for the half-hour drive back to the Sheraton.
Sunday, November 22nd—Interior Ministry Training Range, Kuwait
Over breakfast, Neil gave me the latest on the local situation. Though the threat from the terrorist groups that had worried Neil and his bosses seemed to be declining, our vehicle would be out in the open without escort, and so two additional security personnel from the embassy would be joining us on our travels.
The more the merrier.
I grabbed my daypack and we all loaded up into the big Chevy. It was a beautifully haze- and dust-free day. It was going to be hot, but the absence of humidity made life bearable.
Heading north on a six-lane highway, we drove about 18 miles/30 km. until the flat desert terrain began to rise. In more peaceful times this road had connected Kuwait City with Al Basrah in Iraq, and though it showed no signs of damage today, it had seen much fighting during the war. Soon we turned east onto a side road and went a few miles/kilometers until a series of walled compounds appeared on our left. These were the small-arms training ranges for the Kuwaiti Ministry of the Interior Police Force troops.