The End by Ian Kershaw
9. Even without access to secret reports, the regular monitoring of the German press and that of correspondents from neutral countries, such as Sweden, based in Germany, gave the British a clear enough indication of the demoralized condition of the retreating Wehrmacht and the chaotic disorganization of the evacuation of western regions. – NAL, FO898/187, fos. 489–90, 522–3, 540–42, 559–61, 577 (reports from 11.9–22.10.44).
10. BAB, R55/601, fos. 73–4, Tätigkeitsbericht, weekly report of propaganda offices, 14.8.44.
11. MadR, 17, pp. 6705–8, ‘Reports on Developments in Public Opinion’, 17.8.44. This was the last report of its kind. Martin Bormann stopped the regular digest of SD reports on account of their defeatist tone.
12. BAB, R55/601, fos. 102–6, Tätigkeitsbericht, weekly propaganda report 4.9.44. Goebbels noted the ‘rather dark picture’ of morale that emanated from the propaganda reports in his diary entry for 15.9.44 (TBJG, II/13, pp. 484–5).
13. BAB, R55/603, fos. 411, 413, Stimmung durch Ereignisse im Westen, 5.9.44.
14. BAB, R19/751, fo. 4, Gebhardt to Himmler, 5.9.44; copy in IfZ, Fa-93.
15. This follows the excellent, detailed account in Christoph Rass, René Rohrkamp and Peter M. Quadflieg, General Graf von Schwerin und das Kriegsende in Aachen: Ereignis, Mythos, Analyse, Aachen, 2007, pp. 29–64. This solid research supplants the earlier versions of the dramatic events that emphasize Schwerin’s role in defying the evacuation orders in Bernhard Poll (ed.), Das Schicksal Aachens im Herbst 1944: Authentische Berichte, Aachen, 1955, pp. 213–56; Bernhard Poll (ed.), Das Schicksal Aachens im Herbst 1944: Authentische Berichte II, Aachen, 1962, pp. 65–77, 80–97; Walter Görlitz, Model: Strategie der Defensive, Wiesbaden, 1975, pp. 211–12; DZW, 6, p. 113.
16. TBJG, II/13, pp. 462–3 (12.9.44).
17. TBJG, II/13, pp. 491–2 (16.9.44).
18. TBJG, II/13, p. 498 (17.9.44). See also Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, vol. 2, Buenos Aires, 1950, p. 137 (18.9.44); and Olaf Groehler, ‘Die Schlacht um Aachen (September/Oktober 1944)’, Militärgeschichte (1979), p. 326.
19. TBJG, II/13, pp. 500–501 (17.9.44).
20. BAB, R3/1539, fos. 12–14, summary report, dated 14.9.44, of Speer’s visit to the west, 10–14.9.44.
21. BAB, R3/1539, fos. 17–31, report of 16.9.44 for Hitler on his visit to the western area, 10–14.9.44.
22. BAB, R3/1539, fos. 7–9, draft report by Dorsch on his ministerial trip to the western front, 13.9.44.
23. IWM, EDS, F.2, AL2837A, unfoliated, Kaltenbrunner to Himmler, 16.9.44, sending reports from 12–16.9.44. Few Party functionaries evidently had any intention of following Bormann’s instructions that, in areas falling to the enemy, they were to report voluntarily to the Wehrmacht and serve with the fighting troops. – BAB, NS6/167, fo. 100–100v, Bormann to the Gauleiter, 16.9.44. A letter home from an officer stationed in the west spoke of the ‘purest panic’ after Gauleiter Josef Bürckel had ordered Germans to leave Lorraine on 1 September. No trains were available, and officials were at the forefront of the flight. – BfZ, Sammlung Sterz, Lt. Otto F., Berghaupten, 13.9.44.
24. BAB, NS19/3809, fo. 16, wire to Standartenführer D’Alquen for immediate presentation to Himmler, signed Damrau, SS-Standarte ‘Kurt Eggers’, September, ?13.9.44. Gauleiter Simon, the head of the civilian administration in Luxemburg, moved his office to Koblenz, where he complained at the end of October that he had not received copies of edicts and ordinances, asking for these to be sent to him, including those for the period since the end of August. – BAB, R43II/583a, fo. 151, Der Chef der Zivilverwaltung in Luxemburg an den Reichminister der Finanzen, 31.10.44.
25. BA/MA, MSg2/2697, fos. 39–46, diary of Lieutenant Julius Dufner, entries for 1–18.9.44.
26. For the revival of criticism of the Etappe – which had not featured in the early, successful, years of the war – in the wake of the collapse in France, see Bernhard R. Kroener, ‘ “Frontochsen” und “Etappenbullen”: Zur Ideologisierung militärischer Organisationsstrukturen im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (eds.), Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität, Munich, 1999, pp. 380–84.
27. TBJG, II/13, pp. 394–5 (3.9.44).
28. DZW, 6, p. 106.
29. BAB, NS19/3911, fo. 5, Himmler to HSSPF in west, 23.8.44.
30. BAB, NS19/1864, fos. 7–13, Bormann to Himmler, 29.8.44, Holz to Bormann, 28.8.44, Himmler to Bormann, 1.9.44.
31. BAB, R55/620, fos. 101–3, report by Generalleutnant Dittmar, 26.9.44.
32. BA/MA, RH19/IV/14, Tätigkeitsbericht der Geh. Feldpolizei für September 1944 (27.10.44).
33. BAB, NS19/1858, fos. 1–7, Chef des NS-Führungsstabes des Heeres, Kurze Aktennotiz über Frontbesuch im Westen in der Zeit vom 22.9–3.10.1944, 5.10.44.
34. On 1 September, the OKW passed on an order from Hitler that troops retreating from the west and not needed for relocation to other theatres were to give up weaponry and equipment as they crossed the frontier into Germany, which could then be redeployed for the western front. – BAB, NS6/792, fo. 15–15v, Oberbefehlsleiter Hellmuth Friedrichs, head of Abteilung II (Parteiangelegenheiten) in the Party Chancellery, to western Gauleiter, 1.9.44.
35. DZW, 6, p. 108; BA/MA, RW4/494, fo. 94, Chef des OKW, Maßnahmen gegen Auflösungserscheinungen in der Truppe, 23.9.44.
36. BA/MA, RW4/494, fo. 108, Jodl to Ob.West, etc., 16.9.44; DZW, 6, pp. 106–9, partial facsimile of Hitler’s order of 16.9.44, p. 109; Heinrich Schwendemann, ‘ “Verbrannte Erde”? Hitlers “Nero-Befehl” vom 19. März 1945’, in Kriegsende in Deutschland, Hamburg, 2005, p. 158.
37. DZW, 6, pp. 119–20; Groehler, pp. 331–2.
38. NAL, WO208/4364, pp. 2–6 (quotation, in English, p. 6) (26–8.10.44).
39. DZW, 6, p. 111. For examples of the fanaticism and belief in Hitler among wounded SS men in France, see Beevor, p. 324.
40. Kurt Pätzold and Manfred Weißbecker, Geschichte der NSDAP 1920–1945, Cologne, 1981, pp. 369–70.
41. Bernd Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten, Paderborn, 1982, p. 306.
42. Examples from August and September 1944 in Ortwin Buchbender and Reinhold Sterz (eds.), Das andere Gesicht des Krieges: Deutsche Feldpostbriefe 1939–1945, Munich, 1982, pp. 154–61. A number of large samples of soldiers’ correspondence in August and September 1944 tested by the censors showed mixed results. Some indicated a slight rise in positive attitudes towards the regime and the war effort. Others pointed in the opposite direction, with a small increase in negative attitudes and trend towards war-weariness. Unsurprisingly, however, political views were expressed (or hinted at) in only a fraction of the correspondence. Most of the letters confined themselves to personal matters. – DRZW, 9/1 (Förster), pp. 631–3. The limited indoctrination with the ideals of National Socialism is a general hallmark of letters to and from the front, dominated above all by private concerns. See DRZW, 9/2 (Kilian), pp. 287–8. For an assessment of the value of the letters as a reflection of ordinary soldiers’ mentalities, see Klaus Latzel, ‘Wehrmachtsoldaten zwischen “Normalität” und NS-Ideologie, oder: Was sucht die Forschung in der Feldpost?’, in Müller and Volkmann, pp. 573–88.
43. DRZW, 9/1 (Rass), pp. 686–90; Christoph Rass, ‘Menschenmaterial’: Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront. Innenansichten einer Infanteriedivision 1939–1945, Paderborn, 2003, pp. 121–34, esp. pp. 122–3; also Andreas Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage: Die bewaffnete Macht in der Endphase der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944 bis 1945, Munich, 2007, p. 114. Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare, New York, 1986, p. 49, estimates that around 30 per cent of officers had been members of the Nazi Party.
44. NAL, WO219/4713, fos. 907–8, SHAEF report, 4.9.44.
45. NAL, WO219/4713, fos. 906–7, SHAEF report, 11.9.44.
46. BAB, R55/601, fo. 104, Tätigkeitsbericht, weekly propaganda report, 4.9.44.
47. ‘Wollt Ihr den totalen Krieg?’ Die geheimen Goebbels-Konferenzen 1939–1943
48. BAB, R55/601, fo. 113, Tätigkeitsbericht, weekly propaganda report, 11.9.44.
49. TBJG, II/13, p. 388 (2.9.44).
50. MadR, vol. 17, p. 6708 (17.8.44); BHStA, MA 106695, report of RPvOB, 6.9.44. The first V2 rocket attack on London on 8 September, causing only a few casualties, was not publicized in the German press. When eventually, two months later, news of the V2 attacks was broadcast, there was a mixed reaction. Satisfaction, revived hopes and an upturn in mood were reported, though Berliners were said to have been ‘not specially impressed’. – Steinert, pp. 511–12; Das letzte halbe Jahr: Stimmungsberichte der Wehrmachtpropaganda 1944/45, ed. Wolfram Wette, Ricarda Bremer and Detlef Vogel, Essen, 2001, p. 147 (7–12.11.44).
51. BAB, R55/601, fos. 78–9, Tätigkeitsbericht, weekly propaganda report, 14.8.44.
52. Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany, Oxford, 2001, pp. 226–30.
53. BAB, R55/623, fos. 56–9, Wochenübersicht über Zuschriften zum totalen Kriegseinsatz, 28.8.44.
54. MadR, 17, pp. 6697–8 (10.8.44).
55. Michael Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919–1945, Oxford, 1983, p. 263 (figure 1).
56. Figures from Pätzold and Weißbecker, pp. 354, 375, 419 n. 17.
57. TBJG, II/13, p. 389 (2.9.44); Eleanor Hancock, National Socialist Leadership and Total War 1941–45, New York, 1991, p. 164.
58. On 31 August Bormann ordered schools and universities to continue until their pupils, students or teachers were conscripted for work in armaments, in accordance with the restrictions laid down by Goebbels. – BHStA, Reichsstatthalter Epp 644/2, unfoliated, Party Chancellery circular 209/44, 31.8.44.
59. DZW, 6, pp. 230–31; Hancock, p. 148.
60. Dieter Rebentisch, Führerstaat und Verwaltung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Stuttgart, 1989, pp. 520–21.
61. Goebbels decided, however, having gained Hitler’s agreement, not to proceed with this further increase of the age limit for women’s labour duty. – TBJG, II/14, p. 218 (16.11.44).
62. TBJG, II/13, pp. 307–9 (24.8.44).
63. BAB, R43II/680a, fos. 135–7, Spende des Führers (Eierkognak) an die NSV, costs of supplying the liqueur, 12–18.8.44.
64. BHStA, Reichsstatthalter Epp 681/6, unfoliated, Stuckart to RVKs, 3.9.44; BAB, R43II/1648, Lammers to RVK, 4.9.44.
65. Rebentisch, p. 522.
66. Hancock, pp. 155, 158.
67. Hancock, pp. 151, 156. Goebbels was well aware that 70 per cent of the exempted occupations were in the armaments industry. – TBJG, II/13, p. 239 (10.8.44).
68. DRZW, 5/2 (Müller), pp. 750, 752, 762, 767; DZW, 6, p. 229.
69. TBJG, II/13, p. 397 (3.9.44).
70. TBJG, II/13, pp. 196–7 (2.8.44).
71. DZW, 6, p. 231; TBJG, II/13, p. 239 (10.8.44); BAB, R3/1740, fos. 38–9, Speer-Chronik.
72. DRZW, 5/2 (Müller), p. 761.
73. Von Oven, p. 124 (1.9.44).
74. Hancock, pp. 162–4; Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party, vol. 2: 1933–1945, Newton Abbot, 1973, pp. 470–72; BAB, R3/1740, fos. 43, 81, Speer-Chronik.
75. BAB, R3/1740, fos. 103–4, Speer-Chronik; TBJG, II/13, pp. 370 (31.8.44), 378 (1.9.44), 388–9 (2.9.44), 452 (10.9.44), 490 (16.9.44), 525–7 (20.9.44), 568 (26.9.44); von Oven, pp. 127–9 (3.9.44), 134 (10.9.44).
76. DRZW, 5/2 (Müller), pp. 764–6. For Bormann’s antagonism, see Louis Eugene Schmier, ‘Martin Bormann and the Nazi Party 1941–1945’, Ph.D. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1969 (University Microfilms Inc., Ann Arbor), pp. 304–8, 312–13.
77. TBJG, II/13, p. 388 (2.9.44).
78. BAB, R3/1526, fos. 3–19, Speer to Hitler, 20.9.44. See also Hancock, p. 167.
79. Albert Speer, Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main and Berlin, 1969, p. 407.
80. See DZW, 6, p. 228, Speer’s Posen speech, 3.8.44; BAB, R3/1527, fo. 13, Speer to Hitler, 3.10.44.
81. BAB, R3/1527, fos. 8–9, Stellungnahme zur Führerinformation v. Dr. Goebbels, 26.9.44; fo. 10–10v, Speer to Bormann, 2.10.44; fos. 12–15, Speer to Hitler, 3.10.44 (quotation, fo. 12).
82. TBJG, II/14, pp. 329–30 (2.12.44).
83. See TBJG, II/14, p. 383 (9.12.44).
84. DRZW, 5/2 (Müller), p. 754.
85. DRZW, 5/2 (Müller), pp. 755–61; DZW, 6, pp. 364–5.
86. BAB, R3/1740, fo. 111, Speer-Chronik, mentions some of these aims.
87. Speer’s suggestion in his Erinnerungen, p. 411, that this emphasis was a tactical device, in case Hitler should hear that installations close to the front had not been destroyed sounds like a later rationalization of something that at the time he genuinely advocated.
88. Speer, p. 410. See also Gregor Janssen, Das Ministerium Speer: Deutschlands Rüstung im Krieg, Berlin, Frankfurt am Main and Vienna, 1968, pp. 304–7; Matthias Schmidt, Albert Speer: Das Ende eines Mythos, Berne and Munich, 1982, pp. 146–7; and Hans Kehrl, Krisenmanager im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf, 1973, pp. 412–13. Hitler had agreed in August, during the retreat from France, that industrial plant in danger of falling into enemy hands should be temporarily immobilized, not destroyed. – BAB, R3/1512, fo. 57, notes from armaments conferences 18–20.8.44; printed in Deutschlands Rüstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Hitlers Konferenzen mit Albert Speer 1942–1945, ed. Willi A. Boelcke, Frankfurt am Main, 1969, p. 402. Speer (pp. 411–12) had, however, then been alarmed at signs in early September that Hitler intended a ‘scorched earth’ policy in Germany. This was from a leading article in the Völkischer Beobachter on 7 September, written by Helmut Sündermann, deputy Reich Press Chief, on Hitler’s direct instructions, Speer said (p. 577 n. 13). Goebbels was displeased with the article, written without his agreement, which had been badly received by the public. – TBJG, II/13, p. 493 (16.9.44). See also von Oven, p. 137 (18.9.44), who described the article as ‘idiotic’.
89. BAB, R3/1539, fos. 7–14, 17–31, reports on visit to the west, 14.9.44, 16.9.44 (quotation, fo. 28); R3/1740, fos. 106–7, Speer-Chronik; BAB, R3/1623, fos. 22, 24–7, 50–52, 66–8, 77–77v, directives on disabling industry in the west.
90. BAB, R3/1540, fos. 6–23, report on the visit to the western areas, 26.9.–1.10.44 (5.10.44); description of the visit in R3/1740, fos. 112–25, Speer-Chronik. See also Speer, p. 408.
91. BAB, R3/1583, fos. 110–11, Speer to Himmler, Bewachungs-Mannschaften für KZ-Häftlinge, 29.10.44.
92. Speer, p. 409; Gitta Sereny, Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth, London, 1995, p. 460. And see the critical assessment of Speer’s claim to have accepted at an early stage that the war was lost, by Alfred C. Mierzejewski, ‘When Did Albert Speer Give up?’, Historical Journal, 31 (1988), pp. 391–7.
93. A point he makes in Erinnerungen, p. 411. For the industrialists’ preparations for peace, see Ludolf Herbst, Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft, Stuttgart, 1982, pp. 345–7 and part V generally.
94. DRZW, 5/2 (Müller), p. 302.
95. IWM, Box 367/27, Speer Interrogations, Karl Saur, 11–13.6.45; Box 368/77, Kurt Weissenborn, December 1945–March 1946. And see, for Saur’s brutal mode of operation, Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, London, 2006, pp. 628–9.
96. DZW, 6, p. 266.
97. Around 2.5 million additional foreign workers and prisoners of war were put to work in Germany between the beginning of 1943 and autumn 1944, two-thirds of these from the east. Nearly a third of the labour force in the mining, metal, chemical and building industries in August 1944 consisted of foreign workers. – Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter: Politik und Praxis des ‘Ausländer-Einsatzes’ in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches, Bonn, 1985, pp. 258, 270.
98. DZW, 6, pp. 261–3. See Herbert, pp. 327–31, for increasingly arbitrary and violent persecution of foreign workers as fears of a breakdown of order grew in the last months of the war.